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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Keith Case appeals his convictions in these four consolidated cases. He 
contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence in 
all four cases because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate the 
traffic stop of Mr. Case's car. By the officer's own admission, the only information he 
had when he initiated the traffic stop was that the car was being driven with a 
"dealer" license plate outside of normal business hours. However, as there are several 
exceptions in the relevant statute, I.C. § 49-1627, which allow numerous people to 
legitimately drive a car with a dealer license plate outside of normal business hours, that 
fact alone does not give rise to reasonable suspicion. Therefore, the stop based on that 
fact alone was invalid and all the evidence discovered as a result of that stop should 
have been suppressed. As such, this Court should reverse the district court's order 
denying Mr. Case's motion to suppress and remand this case for further proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Darrell Heck, the secretary of by B & T Auto Sales and Salvage, Inc., who lived 
next door to the business, knew Mr. Case, an employee of that company, had come in 
to get some work done on Thanksgiving Day, 2013. (Tr., Vol.2, p.9, Ls.1-2.)1 Although 
the company was not generally open on Thanksgiving, it was not a problem for 
Mr. Case to come in and work outside of normal business hours; he was free to come in 
1 The transcripts in this case are provided in three independently bound and paginated 
volumes. To avoid confusion, "Vol.1" will refer to the volume containing the transcript of 
the preliminary hearing held on December 27, 2013. "Vol.2" will refer to the volume 
containing the transcript of the hearing on Mr. Case's motion to suppress held on 
March 21, 2014. "Vol.3" will refer to the volume containing the transcripts of the jury trial 
(May 8, 2014-May 9, 2014) and the sentencing hearing (July 11, 2014). 
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and work at any time. (Tr., Vol.2, p.8, Ls.5-23.) Mr. Case was also authorized to use 
the company's dealer license plates as part of his job. ( See Tr., Vol.2, p.8, Ls.15-18.) 
On this occasion, Mr. Case was working on an SUV which had one of the company's 
dealer plates affixed to the back. (Tr., Vol.2, p.8, Ls.15-18; Tr., Vol.3, p.117, Ls.9-16.) 
The registration for that dealer plate was up to date. (Tr., Vol.2, p.3, L.15 - p.7, L.25; 
see Defense Exhibit A (introduced at the motion to suppress hearing).) 
Mr. Case began driving the car and happened to drive past Officer Dan Drake. 
The officer, seeing no front license plate, pulled in behind Mr. Case, at which point he 
saw the dealer plate. (Tr., Vol.3, p.117, Ls.9-16.) Because it was not normal business 
hours, he decided to stop Mr. Case's car to see if he was using the dealer plate 
properly. (Tr., Vol.3, p.117, Ls.13-14; Tr., Vol.3, p.144, Ls.17-22.) In fact, Officer Drake 
asserted, "I routinely stop vehicles with dealer plates on them outside of business hours 
for that very purpose to find out if [the drivers are] aware of how they're supposed to use 
the plate." (Tr., Vol.2, p.19, Ls.1-4.) 
Officer Drake informed dispatch that he was initiating the traffic stop on 
Mr. Case's car, and, at that same time, asked dispatch to check the license plate 
number. (Tr., Vol.3, p.143, L.2 - p.144, L.4.) As he was stopping Mr. Case's car, 
dispatch informed Officer Drake that the license number he had given them "did not 
return."2 (Tr., Vol.3, p.117, Ls.14-16.) Officer Drake understood that to mean dispatch 
was unable to find a record of that plate. (Tr., Vol.3, p.117, Ls.17-19.) 
2 At the preliminary hearing, Officer Drake testified that dispatch told him the license 
number did not return before he initiated the stop of Mr. Case's car. (Tr., Vol.1, p.6, 
Ls.16-19.) However, he clarified that testimony at the jury trial: he did not get that 
information from dispatch until after he initiated the stop of Mr. Case's car. (Tr., Vol.3, 
p.143, L.25 - p.144, L.25.) This change in the officer's testimony prompted Mr. Case to 
renew his motion to suppress at the jury trial. (Tr., Vol.3, p.187, L.15 - p.190, L.8.) 
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Officer Drake asked Mr. Case for his identification, and Mr. Case admitted that 
he did not have his license or insurance on him and did not know if the registration was 
in the vehicle. (Tr., Vol.3, p.118, Ls.3-6.) A subsequent check of Mr. Case's name and 
birth date, which Mr. Case gave to the officer, revealed that Mr. Case's driver's license 
was invalid. (Tr., Vol.3, p.118, Ls.9-13.) During their initial conversation, Officer Drake 
also asked Mr. Case if he had anything illegal in the car. (Tr., Vol.3, p.119, Ls.8-9.) 
Mr. Case hesitated and looked away from Officer Drake when he asked that question. 
(Tr., Vol.3, p.119, Ls.9-10.) Officer Drake followed up, asking "if he had marijuana in 
the car." (Tr., Vol.1, p.8, L.5.) Mr. Case answered, "Well, maybe a little." (Tr., Vol.3, 
p.119, Ls.11-12.) 
Officer Drake asked Mr. Case to get out of the car. Mr. Case did not immediately 
comply, instead saying, "come on man. It's Thanksgiving." (Tr., Vol.3, p.119, Ls.14-
·16.) When Officer Drake repeated his instruction for Mr. Case to get out of the car, 
Mr. Case complied. (Tr., Vol.2, p.15, Ls.6-17.) Officer Drake confirmed that Mr. Case 
did not threaten to harm any of the officers on scene. (Tr., Vol.3, p.152, Ls.12-14.) 
Nevertheless, Officer Drake put Mr. Case in handcuffs for officer safety and 
proceeded to search Mr. Case. (Tr., Vol.2, p.15, Ls.16 - p.16, L.19.) During that 
search, Officer Drake pulled several items from Mr. Case's pockets. (Tr., Vol.3, 
p.121, Ls.1-8.) Specifically, he found a baggie of marijuana and a baggie of 
methamphetamine in Mr. Case's pants pocket, and he found two pipes in Mr. Case's 
jacket pocket. (Tr., Vol.3, p.121, Ls.5-8; Tr., Vol.1, p.9, Ls.5-11.) A subsequent search 
of the car revealed an open can of Bud Lite between the center console and front 
passenger seat. (Tr., Vol.3, p.129, Ls.23-25.) 
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Mr. Case was subsequently charged with several offenses in four separate cases 
as a result of this incident. In CR 20·13-27100 (Docket Number 42363), he was charged 
with misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), and misdemeanor 
driving with an open container. (R, pp.8-9.) In CR 2013-27102 (Docket Number 
42364), he was charged with misdemeanor driving without obtaining a license. 
(R., pp.17-18.) In CR 2013-27103 (Docket Number 42365), Mr. Case was charged with 
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.26-27.) Finally, in CR 2013-
27115 (Docket Number 42366), Mr. Case was charged with felony possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine). (R., pp.54-55.) 
Mr. Case filed a motion to suppress the evidence in all four cases. (R., pp.67-
71.) He argued, inter alia, that Officer Drake did not have reasonable suspicion to 
initiate the traffic stop. (R., pp.67-71.) At a hearing on that motion, Mr. Heck and 
Officer Drake offered testimony. (See generally Tr., Vol.2.) The parties also stipulated 
to the admission of the transcript of the preliminary hearing, and the district court 
noted that it had reviewed that transcript. (Tr., Vol.2, p.1, Ls.15-19.) 
Based on Officer Drake's testimony at the preliminary hearing - that dispatch had 
told him the license plate "did not return" before he initiated the traffic stop (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.6, Ls.16-19) (see note 2, supra) - the district court determined that Officer Drake had 
reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Case's car because of the report from dispatch. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.32, Ls.8-13.) It also determined that, because Mr. Case was not a full-time 
salesperson, and because the car was being driven on Thanksgiving (outside of normal 
business hours), there was reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. (Tr., Vol.2, p.32, 
Ls.13-25; Tr., Vol.2, p.33, L.22 - p.34, L.9.) As a result, it denied Mr. Case's motion to 
suppress. (Tr., Vol.2, p.34, Ls.15-16.) 
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Mr. Case exercised his right to a jury trial in all four cases, and they were all tried 
together. (See, e.g., R., pp.157-61.) During Officer Drake's testimony, the officer 
clarified that he initiated the stop on Mr. Case's car before dispatch reported back as to 
the status of the dealer plate: 
Q. [by defense counsel] And so you're indicating now that at the same 
time that you called in you were initiating a traffic stop, that was the 
moment you also asked to check on this plate; is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. So technically you initiated the traffic stop prior to your information on 
the plate; is that correct? 
A. I initiated the traffic stop the same time I called it in. And yes. 
Q. And because it was Thanksgiving, you had questions of whether or not 
this vehicle was driving within the constraints of the dealer plate, and 
that's why you effectuated the traffic stop? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. And that was before you'd received any information about the 
plate itself? 
A. That's correct. 
(Tr., Vol.3, p.143, L.19 - p.144, L.25.) 
Based on this clarification of Officer Drake's testimony, defense counsel renewed 
the motion to suppress arguing that Officer Drake did not have reasonable suspicion to 
initiate a traffic stop on Mr. Case's car. (Tr., Vol.3, p.187, L.15 - p.190, L.18.) The 
district court was "concerned about the officer's change in testimony." (Tr., Vol.3, p.195, 
Ls.11-12.) However, it decided that reasonable suspicion was sufficiently established 
by facts beside the report that the license plate "did not return," specifically, that the car 
was being driven with a dealer plate outside of normal business hours. (Tr., Vol.3, 
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p:195, L.12 - p.196, L 14.) Therefore, based on those other facts only, the district court 
denied the renewed motion to suppress. (Tr., Vol.3, p.196, Ls.12-14.) 
The jury ultimately convicted Mr. Case on all the charges except the open 
container charge from Docket No. 42363. (R., pp.157-61.) The district court imposed a 
four hundred dollar fine for the other charge in that case (possession of marijuana). 
(R., p.11.) In Docket No. 42364, the district court imposed a three hundred dollar fine 
for failure to purchase a license. (R., p.20.) In Docket No. 42365, the district court 
imposed a three hundred dollar fine for the possession of drug paraphernalia charge. 
(R., p.28.) Finally, in Docket No. 42366, the district court imposed a unified term of 
three years, with one and one-half fixed, for the possession of methamphetamine. 
(R, p. ·l 92.) It suspended Mr. Case's prison sentence for a three-year period of 
probation. (R., pp:192-93.) 
Mr. Case filed a timely notice of appeal in all four cases. ( See R., pp.195, 




Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Case's motion to suppress evidence 
in all four cases. 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Case's Motion To Su oress Evidence In All 
Four Cases 
A. Introduction 
In this case, the district court erred in applying the relevant law to the facts. It 
ignored three exceptions in I.C. § 49-1627. Those exceptions allow numerous people to 
legitimately drive a car with dealer plates outside of normal business hours. It also 
ignored the Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Salois, 144 Idaho 344 (Ct. App. 2007), 
which held that an officer does not have reasonable suspicion to pull a car over just to 
make sure that it is properly using the plate or permit it is displaying. And yet, that is 
exactly what Officer Drake admitted to doing in this case: "I routinely stop vehicles with 
dealer plates on them outside of business hours for that very purpose to find out if [the 
drivers are] aware of how they're supposed to use the plate." {Tr., Vol.2, p.19, Ls.1-4.) 
As a result, it erred when it concluded the traffic stop was supported by a reasonable 
suspicion that the car was being driven contrary to Idaho law. 
B. Standard Of Review 
'The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. This Court accepts 
the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Watts, 
142 Idaho 230, 232 (2005). 
C. The Fact That The Car Was Being Driven With A Dealer Plate Outside Of Normal 
Business Hours Did Not Give The Officer Reasonable Suspicion To Initiate The 
Traffic Stop 
'Traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment." State v. 
Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013). The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
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Constitution provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . 
. . . " U.S. CONST. amend IV. The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961 ); 
State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 5·16, 524 (1986). The Idaho Constitution provides its own, 
similar protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. IDAH0 CONST. Art. I, § 
17; State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 471 (2001 ). 
As such, limited investigatory detentions, such as traffic stops, are only 
permissible when they are "justified by an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that 
a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime." Morgan, 154 !d~iho at ·112. 
"Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational 
inferences that can be drawn from those facts. Reasonable suspicion requires more 
than a mere hunch or inchoate and unparticularized suspicion. The test for reasonable 
suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before 
the time of the stop." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Because there was no reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Case's car, this Court 
should reverse the district court's erroneous order denying Mr. Case's motion to 
suppress all the evidence found as a result of that traffic stop. 
During his testimony at trial, Officer Drake admitted that he initiated the traffic 
stop of Mr. Case's car before dispatch relayed any information about the validity of the 
dealer license plate on Mr. Case's car. (Tr., Vol.3, p.117, Ls.12-16; Tr., Vol.3, p.143, 
L.25 - p.144, L.25.) "[A]n officer must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
before a traffic stop is initiated, not after." Salois, 144 Idaho at 348 (emphasis added); 
cf. State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013) ("The test for reasonable suspicion is 
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based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of 
the stop.") (emphasis added). Therefore, the only information known to Officer Drake at 
the time he initiated the traffic stop of Mr. Case's car was that he was using a dealer 
plate during the afternoon of Thanksgiving Day (i.e., outside of normal business hours). 
The district court concluded that the fact that the car was being driven outside of 
normal business hours was sufficient to give the officer reasonable suspicion that the 
car was being driven in contravention of I.C. § 49-1627. (Tr., Vol.3, p.195, L.11 - p.196, 
L 11.) It also determined that there was no evidence that Mr. Case was actually validly 
using the dealer plate, and that contributed to the reasonable suspicion. (Tr., Vol.2, 
p.32, Ls.16-19). 
The second part of the district court's analysis whether Mr. Case was validly 
using the plates - is actually irrelevant to the issue. Compare Salois, 144 Idaho at 
346-48. In Salois, the Court of Appeals held that the officer did not have reasonable 
suspicion to stop the car in order to investigate the validity of the temporary permit it 
was displaying despite noting that the temporary permit had actually been issued for 
another vehicle and the expiration date on the permit had been altered. Id. 
A temporary permit displayed in compliance with [the relevant statute] 
carries with it a presumption of validity, not invalidity. The mere existence 
of a properly placed temporary permit cannot serve as the 'basis for 
reasonable suspicion to allow an officer to stop a vehicle to inspect the 
permit unless the invalidity of the permit, such as by improper alternation, 
is obvious and discernible by the officer prior to stopping the vehicle. 
Id.; cf. State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 38 n.1 (Ct. App. 2009) (reaffirming that reasonable 
suspicion arises only when the defect in the displayed license plate or permit is obvious 
to the officer before he initiates the traffic stop). Thus, whether or not Mr. Case was 
properly using the dealer plate is not a relevant consideration in the analysis of whether 
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an officer has reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop based on seeing a properly-
displayed dealer license plate outside of normal business hours. 
The district court's conclusion that Mr. Case was not authorized to use the dealer 
plate outside of normal business hours is clearly erroneous as it ignores one of the 
exceptions written into I.C. § 49-1627. See State v. Henage, ·143 Idaho 655, 659 (2007) 
(noting that a district court's factual findings are clearly erroneous when they are not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence, and that clearly erroneous findings 
are to be set aside by the appellate court). Idaho Code § 49-1627(4) provides that: 
"Other employees or authorized persons, not licensed as a vehicle salesman, may use 
a dealer plate when testing the mechanical operation of a vehicle or for the necessary 
operation in pursuance of the dealer's business, including the delivery and pickup of 
vehicles owned or purchased by the manufacturer or dealer." I.C. § 49-1627(4 ). There 
is no time limitation on when these other employees might be working on, testing, or 
moving the cars with dealer plates on them, and so, they may legitimately drive cars 
with dealer plates outside of normal business hours. 
The testimony of Mr. Heck, the secretary of B & T Auto Sales, reveals that 
Mr. Case was driving the car pursuant to this exception: 
Q. [by the prosecutor]: Why would he [Mr. Case] have one of your license 
plates? 
A. Well, it was on a vehicle that we were -- I just purchased and we were 
fixing it. 
Q. But you said you weren't open on Thanksgiving. Would he [Mr. Case] 
have been working on it on Thanksgiving? 
A. He could have been working on it, yeah. He was free to come in any 
time and work. 
Q. But you don't know for sure? 
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A. About what? 
Q. If he was working that day or not. 
A. Well, he was working that day, yeah. 
Q. How do you know that? You just said it was closed. 
A. I live right next door, and he -- I knew he [Mr. Case] was there working. 
Q. Okay. 
A. He can come and work anytime he wants. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.8, L.15 - p.9, L.B.) Thus, Mr. Case was authorized to use one of the 
dealer's plates while working on the dealer's cars. With this car specifically, he was 
repairing it, and so, could drive the car to test its mechanical operation. See I.C. § 49-
1627(4 ). He could also have legitimately driven it for delivery or pickup purposes. See 
id. Furthermore, he was authorized to do so at any time he wanted, and so, was 
legitimately driving it on a Thanksgiving afternoon . 
Therefore, there was evidence that Mr. Case was using the dealer plate. As 
such, even if the district court properly considered whether Mr. Case was properly using 
the dealer plate, its conclusion that he was not is clearly erroneous and should be set 
aside. That conclusion also demonstrates why the officer did not have reasonable 
suspicion to stop Mr. Case's car. 
In addition to the exception in I.C. § 49-1627(4), there are two other exceptions in 
I.C. § 49-1627(3) that would allow any number of other people to legitimately be driving 
a car with dealer plates outside of normal business hours. The first exception is that "[a] 
dealer plate may be used on a vehicle assigned for personal use on a full-time basis to 
the dealer, or licensed full-time vehicle salesman. This personal use exception applies 
only to the manufacturer, dealer, or licensed full-time vehicle salesman personally .... " 
12 
I.C. § 49-1627(3). Thus, under this exception, dealers, manufactures, and certain 
salespeople may drive a vehicle with a dealer plate at any tirne, for any reason, 
including outside of normal business hours since they can use the dealer plate "for 
personal use." Id. (emphasis added). 
The second exception allows that "[a) prospective purchaser of a vehicle may 
have possession of the vehicle with a dealer plate for not more than ninety-six (96) 
hours .... " i.C. § 49-1627(3). Because prospective purchasers may take a car with a 
dealer plate home with them for a three-day period, presumably so they can test drive 
the car so as to decide whether they want to buy it, they are obviously allowed to drive 
the car with dealer plates outside of normal business hours. 
Therefore, because I.C. § 49-1627 authorizes a large group of people - dealers, 
manufacturers, salespeople, prospective purchasers, mechanics, and other dealership 
or manufacturer employees - to legitimately drive cars properly bearing dealer plates 
outside of normal business hours, the district court's conclusion - that the mere fact that 
a car with dealer plates is being driven outside of normal business hours gives an officer 
reasonable suspicion that the car is being driven contrary to I.C. § 49-1627 (Tr., Vol.3, 
p.195, L.11 - p.196, L.11) - is plainly wrong. 
Worse, under the district court's rationale, each and every vehicle being 
legitimately driven pursuant to any of these three exceptions would be subject to being 
stopped at officers' unfettered discretion so the officer might investigate the validity of 
the dealer plate. In fact, Officer Drake's testimony reveals that he does stop these 
people without any particularized suspicion: "I routinely stop vehicles with dealer plates 
on them outside of business hours for that very purpose to find out if [the drivers are] 
aware of how they're supposed to use the plate." (Tr., Vol.2, p.19, Ls.1-4.) Such 
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suspicionless stops, based only on the hunch that the car might bo being driven in 
violation of Idaho law, are impermissible. 
In fact, this case is almost identical to Salois, 144 Idaho 344, in that regard. In 
Salois, the State claimed that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the car and 
investigate whether its displayed temporary permit was being used validly. Id. at 348. 
The Court of Appeals soundly rejected that idea: "[T]he presence of a properly 
displayed temporary permit, subject to the discussion below dispels any reasonable 
suspicion of a violation of I.C. § 49-456(1) [the relevant statute]." Id. (emphasis added). 
Allowing otherwise, the Court held, "would allow law enforcement officers of this state 
unfettered discretion to stop each and every vehicle being operated vvith a temporary 
registration to 'investigate' its validity." Id. That was unacceptable because "an officer 
must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before a traffic stop is initiated, not 
after." Id. Furthermore, "[a] temporary permit displayed in compliance with I.C. § 49-
432(3) carries with it a presumption of validity, not invalidity." Id. (emphasis added). 
As a result, the Court of Appeals held, "[t]he mere existence of the properly 
placed temporary permit cannot serve as the basis for reasonable suspicion to allow an 
officer to stop a vehicle to inspect the permit unless the invalidity of the permit, such as 
by improper alteration, is obvious and discernible by the officer prior to stopping the 
vehicle." Id. In so holding, it rejected the State's argument, which "would allow law 
enforcement officers to presume that temporary permits are invalid per se, justifying an 
officer to stop a vehicle in order to conduct further inspection concerning the legitimacy 
of the temporary permit." Id. 
The only difference between Salois and this case is the type of permit that was 
displayed on the car the officer stopped. As such, the same flaws that existed in the 
14 
State's argument in Salois exist in the district cou1i's decision in this case. Thus, the 
applicable rule is understood by simply replacing the specific "temporary permit" 
language in Salois with "dealer plate" language: 
The presence of a properly displayed [dealer plate] dispels any 
reasonable suspicion of a violation of [I.C. § 49-1627]. To hold otherwise 
would allow law enforcement officers of this state unfettered discretion to 
stop each and every vehicle being operated with a [dealer plate] to 
"investigate" its validity. To the contrary, an officer must have a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before a traffic stop is initiated, 
not after. A [dealer plate] displayed in compliance with [I.C. § 49-
428(1 )(a)] carries with it a presumption of validity, not of invalidity. The 
mere existence of the properly placed [dealer plate] cannot serve as the 
basis for reasonable suspicion to allow an officer to stop a vehicle to 
inspect the [dealer plate] unless the invalidity of the [dealer plate], such as 
by improper alteration, is obvious and discernible by the officer prior to 
stopping the vehicle. The [district court's] position would allow law 
enforcement officers to presume that the [dealer plates] are invalid per se, 
justifying an officer to stop a vehicle in order to conduct further inspection 
concerning the legitimacy of the [dealer plate]. 
Compare Salois, 144 Idaho at 348. As such, just as Court of Appeals did in Salois, this 
Court should reject that same conclusion in this case. 
When an officer detains a person without reasonable suspicion to do so, as 
Officer Drake did to Mr. Case, all the evidence derived from that unlawful detention 
must be suppressed. See, e.g., State v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 613, 616 (Ct. App. 1997); 
cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 784-85 (1963). As such, this Court 
should reverse the district court's erroneous order denying Mr. Case's motion to 




Mr. Case respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his motion to suppress and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 28th day of April, 2015. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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